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Given the co-equality of the branches of the United States government, the
Supreme Court is commonly considered to enjoy a monopoly on interpreting
the Constitution.' The Court itself has expressed a normative claim to that
effect.2 This claim-and its many implications for the proper institutional role
the Constitution actually accords the high court--contextualizes the debate
over the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment and the Court's federalism cases.
A plausible thesis states that the Court's case law on federalism and state
sovereign immunity describes power relations rather than interpretive
differences. That is, the case law in these areas reflects a broader sphere in
which the Court limits the roles of the other branches in constitutional
interpretation. Although constitutional support for the Court's broad
assumption of power may be slim to non-existent,3 power dynamics constitute a
useful prism through which to understand the recent reinvigoration of
federalism and state sovereign immunity to limit the powers of the national
government. Thus, the Court's recent case law on federalism and the Eleventh
Amendment reflects the now accepted norm of unquestioned judicial
supremacy. The case law shows the Court's conservative majority acting
robustly to curtail the powers of Congress, often placing the other branches of
t Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2004. S.U.N.Y Stony Brook, B.A. 2001. The author gratefully
acknowledges professors Ian Ayres and Jeff Segal for insightful comments on earlier drafts, and thanks
Jeff Goldman for his excellent editorial contributions, and Joshua Elohe for inspiration.
* John T. Noonan, Jr., Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and
Robbins Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley.
1. KENNETH W. STARR, FIRST AMONG EQUALS: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE (2002);
Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 5-6 (2001).
2. As former Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes declared, "We are under a Constitution, but the
Constitution is what the judges say it is." Chief Justice Hughes' remarks are quoted in ROBERT H.
JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A STUDY OF A CRISIS IN AMERICAN POWER
POLITICS 3 (1941).
3. Akhil Reed Amar, Shouldn't We the People Be Heard More Often by This High Court?, WASH.
POST, June 30, 2002, at B3 (noting that the Constitution appoints the Supreme Court neither the
"ultimate arbiter ... [nor] first among equals...").
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government in a position that is less than equal.4
Doubt about the constitutional yalidity of the Court's recent rulings in these
areas animates John T. Noonan, Jr., senior judge on the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and law professor emeritus at the University of
California at Berkeley. Noonan chastises the Supreme Court for maneuvering
itself into position as "the supreme authority" in the United States (p. 7).
Narrowing the Nation's Power braves the doctrinal thicket of the Supreme
Court's recent Eleventh Amendment and federalism decisions.5 Judge Noonan
advances the following thesis: The five-Justice conservative majority on the
Rehnquist Court has appropriated constitutional doctrine in a way that severely
limits the powers of the national government (p. 5), ignores the text of the
Constitution (p. 9), and arrogates excessive power to the Court at the expense
of other branches of the federal government (p. 1 3).6 Furthermore, Noonan
offers a candid and scathing critique of the Court's Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence, characterizing the decisions as "obfuscations" (p. 12), and
claiming that the Court's decisions offend the Constitution and the values of
American democracy.
The charges are not novel,7 although their source is. His is the unique
perspective of a senior appellate-court judge whose constitutional law
scholarship bespeaks conservative credentials. But, in his careful, earnest logic
and historical analyses, Noonan dispenses more principle than ideology in his
compelling book.
4. E.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating the civil rights remedy in the
Violence Against Women Act as an improper intrusion of the national government into an area reserved
for states); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that the regulation of firearms near
schools was not a matter for the national government). See also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist
Court and Justice: An Oxymoron?, 1 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 37 (1999).
5. See, e.g., Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court's "Unsteady Path": A
Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1447 (1995); John C. Jeffries, Jr., In
Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REv 47 (1998) ([T]he Eleventh
Amendment is a mess. It is the home of self-contradiction, transparent fiction, and arbitrary stops in
reasoning. [It is characterized by] shifting paradigms... and logic-chomping combinations."). The
foremost example of the aforementioned fiction and the doctrinal difficulty raised is the Ex parte Young
doctrine. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Under the Exparte Young fiction, when a state official
is found to have acted beyond his or her official capacity, the actor amenable to suit is the official and
not the state. That is, the officer is stripped of the official cloak of the state. This creates the
contradiction in which a state official is regarded as the state for purposes of Fourteenth Amendment
doctrine but not in Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence.
6. For analysis of how the Supreme Court's decisions could be interpreted as draining power to the
Court and away from the political branches, see Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court: The Fall
of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 301-19
(2002).
7. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 32-36 (2002); Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda,
11l YALE L.J. 1141, 1144 (2002) (describing the Court's rulings on the Eleventh Amendment as one of
several "stalking horses" that veil a wholly different purpose); Matthew B. Stein, Note, Something
Wicked This Way Comes: Constitutional Transformation and the Growing Power of the Supreme Court,
71 FORDHAM L. REV. 579 (2002) (suggesting that the Supreme Court has embarked on a jurisprudence
that shows little fealty to the people or their elected representatives).
Vol. 21:527, 2003
The Court Competes
Every chapter in Noonan's book, save the last, examines a Rehnquist Court
federalism or Eleventh-Amendment decision. In the first six chapters, Noonan
identifies and dissects flaws in the Court's jurisprudence, before exploring
solutions in chapter seven.
Noonan first addresses the Court's decision in City of Boerne v. Flores,
8
which held unconstitutional the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
(RFRA). Providing context, Noonan also examines Employment Division v.
Smith,9 in which the Court held that the First Amendment did not protect
religious practice where it conflicted with generally applicable laws. 10 Because
the RFRA was enacted in reaction to Employment Division, that statute was
also conscripted into the dispute in Boerne."1 But the Court rebuffed Congress
and made its judicial imprimatur final by declaring that Congress can only
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment if it compiles an extensive record of the
conduct it purported to remediate, and limits remediation to what is congruent
and proportional. 12 This effectively relegates Congress to the status of a lower
federal court whose actions are contingent on Court approval. The new
standard the Court announced in Boerne reposed in the judiciary sole
interpretive power as to what legislation was proportional and congruent (p.
35). Boerne emphasized the effect of federal legislation on states, although no
state was involved in the dispute, in a way that cast the Court as defender of the
states.1 3 Implicit in Noonan's concerns is a perception that this judicial
8. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
9. Employment Div., Dep't of Hum. Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
10. Cf Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (holding that First Amendment freedom
of the press is not offended by incidental burdens imposed by laws of general applicability).
11. Proceeding on the assumption that the church's ambitions were constitutionally protected, the
Archbishop of San Antonio sued in federal court to enjoin the local government of Boerne from
stopping the Boerne parish's plan to enlarge its historic but physically inadequate church. As defense,
Boerne challenged the constitutionality of the RFRA, a successful move at trial. The case reached the
Supreme Court after a unanimous Fifth Circuit panel reversed the federal district judge. Flores v. City of
Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court overruled the Fifth Circuit.
Noonan notes that the Ninth Circuit (with Noonan sitting) also ruled on a case involving the RFRA,
reaching a similar result as the Fifth Circuit (pp.162-63). Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104 F.3d 1522 (9th
Cir. 1997) (finding that the RFRA was constitutional and concluding that it was a valid exercise of
Congress's powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). The Mockaitis court cited with
approval the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Boerne as an example of fellow courts of appeals that had found
that the RFRA was validly enacted. Id. at 1530. Furthermore, the Mockaitis court rejected the theory that
the RFRA was unconstitutional because it exempted religion from generally applicable laws. Id. In
addition, the court mentioned tax exemptions and exemptions from military service as examples of
analogous instances where religion was exempt from generally applicable laws. Id.
12. City of Boerne, supra note 8, at 508 ("There must be a congruence and proportionality between
the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.").
13. Noonan sees in the Court's rulings a reawakening of the old "states' rights" conception, or "the
championing of the states at the expense of the nation" (pp. 2-3). Others counter this notion with the
proposition that the current Court's federalism jurisprudence bears no resemblance to the states' rights
advocated in the antebellum and Jim Crow eras. Ronald D. Rotunda, The Implications of the New
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence: An Evolutionary or Revolutionary Court?, 55 ARK. L. REv. 795, 797
(2003). What is more remarkable about the states rights posture of the Court is that it often adopts a
paternalistic form, which the states have sometimes resisted. For instance, Professor Marci Hamilton,
who successfully challenged the RFRA on behalf of the city of Boerne, unwittingly admits this much
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arrogation of power lacks constitutional backing. 14
Sovereign immunity doctrine, like federalism, raises questions about when
national power preempts that of the states and subjects the states to private suits
for damages. Noonan notes that the Constitution is silent on both sovereignty
and immunity (p. 41). Even the Eleventh Amendment does not mention the
judge-made rule of sovereign immunity.1 5 But the Rehnquist Court has
invalidated federal statutes,' 6 narrowed the scope of tort liability for states,'
7
and expanded the power of the Court and states to the detriment of the national
government and ordinary citizens-all ostensibly because the Eleventh
Amendment so commands. Cognizant that "by its terms the [Eleventh]
Amendment applies only to suits against a State by citizens of another State,"
and that the Court has "extended the Amendment's applicability to suits by
citizens against their own States,"' 8 the Court's conservative majority, usually
enamored of text, has responded by "denounc[ing] 'ahistorical literalism"' (p.
57). Furthermore, the Court explains that although the text does not cover "suits
brought by citizens against their own States," it has "long 'understood the
Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the
presupposition... which it confirms."" 9 That is, the Eleventh Amendment
when she observes that several states filed amicus briefs in favor of the law. Marci A. Hamilton, The
Elusive Safeguards of Federalism, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sc. 93, 99-100 (2001). This,
of course, raises the question of whose interests the Court was actually safeguarding.
14. See also Kramer, supra note 1, at 130-58 (2001). The concern about the Court's attitude to
power is also reflected in other contexts. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
15. See William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow
Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35
STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1130-31 (1983) (arguing that the original purpose of the Eleventh Amendment was
a jurisdictional grant); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A
Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1897 (1983) (concluding that the history of sovereign
immunity before the Eleventh Amendment establishes "the absence of any expectation that governments
were to be immune from suit"). For recent scholarly inquest into the history of the Eleventh Amendment
and the jurisprudence it spawned, see generally MELVYN R. DURCHSLAG, STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
(2002) (describing sovereign immunity as integral to an understanding of the purpose of the Eleventh
Amendment).
16. In what one scholar describes as "an assault on the powers of Congress," the Supreme Court
has invalidated no less than twenty-six acts of Congress. Cass R. Sunstein, Taking Over the Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2002, at A19. See also Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, Supreme Court 5 Are on
Power Trip, NEWSDAY, Feb. 21, 2001, at A31. The Court has wholly or partly invalidated about ten
federal statutes in the past decade on account of its new understanding of federalism. This increased
activity contrasts with a single statute invalidated on federalism grounds in the previous fifty years.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 429, 430 (2002). Taking these figures into account, Professors Segal and Spaeth suggest
that the upshot of the resurrection of sovereign immunity by the Court is an invasion into the power of
other branches of the national government. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 7, at 35.
17. E.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (holding that state sovereign
immunity precludes the application of the ADEA to states and thus prevents private suits for damages
against states by individuals who have suffered discrimination as a result of age).
18. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. ofAla. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001).
19. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 72-73 (quoting Seminole Tribe v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996)). The said
presupposition, the Court explains, has two components. The first is that "each State is a sovereign
entity" and the second is that states are not subject to suit unless they consent. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S.
at 54.
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means something other than what its words state.
Chapter three, titled "Votaries," after Alexander Hamilton's unflattering
term for states rights supporters (p. 83), analyzes the concept of sovereign
immunity. Stressing sovereign immunity's common-law roots and ambiguous
constitutional history, Noonan seeks to show that a good-faith historical inquiry
would differ with the Court on the proper role of the Eleventh Amendment in
federal-to-state and state-to-citizen relationships.
20
Chapter four discusses the detrimental effects of contemporary sovereign
immunity doctrine. Patent holders, Noonan reports, cannot protect their patents
by suing states that disregard them (p. 94).21 States may now willfully violate
copyright laws (pp. 98-101), and by extension, discard established notions of
contract law. 22 By shielding the states and remotely attached agencies
("dependency of a dependency of a state" (p. 100)), sovereign immunity
countenances "a right without a remedy" (p. 96).23 Furthermore, notions of rule
of law are implicated, for reliance is eroded,24 and separation of powers
20. One difference is that a sovereign ruler is an absolute ruler who has subjects. Neither sovereign
nor subjects aptly describes the relationship between citizens and any of the several levels and branches
of government in America. Thus sovereign immunity appears to be an inapt way to describe a
republican democracy where "governments ... derive[] their just powers from the consent of the
governed." U.S. CONST. pmbl. This rendering implies that power devolves to the government from the
citizens and it may not be exercised to its grantor's detriment. It is also consistent with the values of the
American republic's founding in its "repudia[tion] [of] British notions of 'sovereign' governmental
omnipotence." Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1436 (1987). Cast
in another light, the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution embody principles superior to
sovereign immunity. These include the principles that empower a free people to self-government in a
republican democracy.
21. One scholar disagrees that "states enjoy carte blanche to infringe on patents." See Pamela S.
Karlan, The Irony of Immunity: The Eleventh Amendment, Irreparable Injury, and Section 1983, 53
STAN. L. REV. 1311, 1314-15 (2001). Professor Karlan finds persuasive the Court's conclusion that
Congress had erred by neither properly justifying its creation of a private cause of action under its
Fourteenth Amendment powers nor making available a sufficient state-law remedy. Id. at 1315.
22. The foundation of contract law is captured in the words, pacta sunct servanda, which means
"promises must be kept." Where as Noonan notes, the threat of damages no longer exists to deter a
publisher (affiliated with a state) from disregarding an author's copyright (p. 101), contracts are no
longer worth much. Aside from copyright law, respect for copyright agreements depends on valid
contracts between author and publisher that may be rendered irrelevant if states are no longer deterred
by damages. Furthermore, it creates a lopsided system where states are immune from suit for infringing
intellectual property rights while they may sue parties who commit that same infraction. Robert T.
Neufeld, Closing Federalism's Loophole in Intellectual Property Rights, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1295,
1312 (2002).
23. To reach this rather incongruous outcome, the Court interpreted "another" to mean "the same,"
that is "Garrett reads a word that is in the Constitution to mean its opposite." Rubenfeld, supra note 7, at
1151. In its own defense, the Court simply stated: "Although by its terms the Eleventh Amendment
applies only to suits against a State by citizens of another State, our cases have extended the
Amendment's applicability to suits by citizens against their own States." Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363
(2001). As Rubenfeld points out, this recourse to rewriting the Constitution is not anomalous in the
decisions of the Court, although it is also of recent vintage. Rubenfeld, supra note 7, at 1157 n. 62.
24. Carlos Manuel Vasquez, Sovereign Immunity, Due Process, and the Alden Trilogy, 109 YALE
L.J. 1927, 1981 (2000) (calling the Court's teachings on sovereign immunity a "doctrinal maze" that
"cannot hope to provide meaningful guidance to litigants or lower courts, or even to the Court itself, let
alone to ordinary citizens"); see also Fallon, Supra note 16 at 492 (2002) (describing the Court's rulings
on federalism as "occasionally bewildering" and "slid[ing] into Byzantine complexity"). Earlier in the
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concerns are heightened (pp. 100-01). Perhaps even more grave is Noonan's
suggestion that Congress is now subject to at-will censorship by any court in
the federal judiciary (p. 100).
Similarly, chapters five and six raise the specter of a Congress hindered
from enacting remedial legislation. In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,25 the
Court ruled that states were immune from the damage provisions of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).2 6 A parallel decision in Board of
Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett held that private damages
could not be enforced against states violating the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA).27 Both laws had provisions abrogating state sovereign immunity.
Noonan observes that by requiring that Congress abrogate state immunity only
by using Boerne's congruent and proportional criteria, "the [C]ourt-created
doctrine of... sovereign immunity ... was now formally equated with the
Constitution" (pp. 116-117).
The theme of individual justice rightly animates Noonan's overall
argument. He surmises that the Court's rulings may now jeopardize the
putatively legitimate claims of numerous injured plaintiffs (pp. 12-13). He cites
United States v. Morrison disapprovingly and upbraids the Court's "almost
complete indifference to the individual plaintiffs" (pp. 144-45). Morrison
exemplifies the triple victimization of plaintiffs-by criminal violations, state
inaction, and unresponsive legal institutions. Noonan concludes astutely that
"the most odious kind of anomaly ... [is] judicial indifference to a right the
other branches of government believed that the Constitution secured" (p. 39).28
same article, Fallon notes that Justice Scalia-a member of the Rehnquist Court's majority in federalism
and Eleventh Amendment cases-prefers a jurisprudence that provides clarity in the law. Id. at 449
n.109 (citing Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1187 (1989)).
25. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
26. Pub. L. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 631-34). Congress
took quick notice of the Court's decision. See Older Workers' Rights Restoration Act of 2001, S. 928,
107 h Cong. § 3 (2002) (making a waiver of sovereign immunity from private suits a condition for states'
receipt of federal funds).
27. 531 U.S. 356 (2001). An important coda applies here: the question of whether plaintiffs can still
successfully claim damages against states through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2002). By its terms, section 1983
makes it possible for plaintiffs to sue and recover damages from state officials acting in their official
capacities. Id. Extant case law may actually circumvent the limitations imposed by the Court's
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. Jeffries, supra note 5, at 49-50; Nick Daum, Case Comment,
Section 1983, Statutes, and Sovereign, 112 YALE L.J. 353 (2002). Also important to note is that this
understanding appears to be applicable to the ADA. Id. at 353 n.3. However, section 1983 may be less
effective where the claim against a state official or state is for statutory as opposed to constitutional
violations. Roger C. Hartley, The Alden Trilogy: Praise and Protest, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 323,
386-92 (2000) (discussing the various possible barriers to the effective use of section 1983 to recover
damages against state officials). But see Daum at 357-58 (arguing that section 1983 damage remedies
should be available against states where Congress has made them explicit).
28. This judicial indifference rejects Congress's and the President's interpretation of the
Constitution as guaranteeing the rights embodied in such laws as the VAWA. Thus, federalism and
sovereign immunity now evoke feelings of oppression in their roles as foundations for the Court's
rulings, for the twin concepts "thwart full remedies for violations of constitutional rights." Amar, supra
note 20, at 1425-26.
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Presumably interpreting a Constitution out of its exile,29  the Court's
jurisprudence seems to have sent justice into exile. 30
Noonan's final chapter offers solutions that Congress might consider. He
suggests that Congress enact new legislation that tiptoes around its Court-
imposed restrictions (p. 141). He notes that Congress's spending power is intact
and thus Congress can invoke it by conditioning funds on state waivers of
immunity (p. 142).31 He asks Congress to enact remedial legislation in
"piecemeal" fashion. He cites the proposed Religious Liberty Protection Act to
that effect (p. 14). But all these suggestions appear to concede the supremacy of
judicial restraints on Congress's ability to act even in its constitutionally
prescribed duties. The suggestions appear to subdue the indignation that fills
the rest of its chapters.
Nevertheless, Noonan's denouement captures the way his analyses point
most strongly to the human dimension of the Court's new federalism and
Eleventh Amendment case law. 32 The ordinary citizen who needs access to the
courthouse cannot-must not-be left without a voice. The citizen member of
the polis is not deserving of less constitutional attention than the institutional
member. In advocacy for ordinary citizens, claims have been made that the
Court's decisions have eviscerated federal civil rights protections, especially
those for the elderly and disabled.33 Moreover, stringent Court-imposed
restrictions on Congress's ability to remedy civil rights violations mean that
victims of sexually motivated violence such as Ms. Brzonkala, the rape victim
in Morrison, find themselves without federal remedy, although they may
29. See generally William W. Van Alstyne, The Constitution in Exile: Is It Time To Bring It In
from the Cold?, 51 DUKE L.J. 1 (2001) (exploring the notion that certain aspects of the Constitution
have been in "exile").
30. Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 52 (contending that the Rehnquist Court lacks a commitment to
implementing the dictates ofjustice and equity in the law).
31. Noonan is less sanguine about this option because the Court could plausibly take umbrage at
Congress imposing conditions on state conduct that relates little to the actual purpose of the funds (p.
142). Nevertheless, it is important to note that one of the Court's own cases tilts the balance for
congressional power to impose conditions on states funds. At least one other scholar has argued that
under to the Court's holding in S.D. v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), Congress can achieve its direct ends
through indirect means. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Listening to the "Sounds of Sovereignty" But
Missing the Beat: Does the New Federalism Really Matter?, 32 IND. L. REV. 11, 15-17 (1998). For a
bibliography of scholarly commentary on conditional spending by Congress, see id. at 16 nn.32 & 33.
32. While important, one may leave aside the question of institutional design; all things considered,
Congress can still exercise the power of the purse-and indeed, legislation-to register its displeasure
with the Court. And the President is by no means an uninfluential actor either. Although the federalism
case law is chipping away at national powers, the national government is still the more powerful actor in
the federal structure of the United States.
33. MARTIN GRABUS, COURTING DISASTER: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE UNMAKING OF
AMERICAN LAW 155 (2002); Sylvia A. Law, In the Name of Federalism: The Supreme Court's Assault
on Democracy and Civil Rights, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 367, 387-390 (2002) (criticizing the Court's
"revolutionary new interpretations of federal statutes that drastically undermine federal statutory
protection of individual rights to liberty and equality"); Brent E. Simmons, The Invincibility of
Constitutional Error: The Rehnquist Court's States' Rights Assault on Fourteenth Amendment
Protections of Individual Rights, 11 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 259, 260 (2001) (asserting that the Court
is "engaged in an aggressive judicial campaign to dismantle federal protection for individual rights").
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theoretically have a right.34 But a right without a remedy is an abnormal legal
creature, often an ineffectual one.
35
To be sure, federalism is implicit in the structure of American government.
Yet, to ignore the human costs of the Court's decisions is to conceive abstractly
of the federal structure of government as not a government over real people.
The cases analyzed and criticized in Judge Noonan's book can satisfy only a
doctrinal construction that does not consider human costs. An analytic lens that
measures the human condition compels Noonan's and others' deep suspicion of
those cases. As Noonan implies, the facts of each case could have brought the
Justices closer to the human experience that their decisions ignore (p. 144). The
names Morrison, Kimel, and Garrett evoke instances where novel
interpretations of constitutional doctrine barred the access of ordinary people to
true justice. These anomalies do not represent the aspirations of the American
people or of American law to a just society.
The Supreme Court has been presented with two new opportunities to
revisit its recent jurisprudence. The Court recently granted certiorari in Medical
Board of California v. Hason.36 Instructively, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, where Judge Noonan sits, rejected the state
Medical Board's sovereign immunity claim against the disability discrimination
suit brought against it. The suit echoes Garrett in bringing to issue the ADA
and the power of Congress to protect disabled Americans.
In Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,3 7 plaintiff brought a
suit for damages against the state of Nevada for alleged violations of the
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA).38 Although his situation
satisfied the Act's provisions, plaintiff-appellee was denied the statutory twelve
weeks of leave without pay to care for his sick wife. In response to the Act's
explicit provision for this kind of situation and its explicit waiver of state
sovereign immunity, Nevada challenged the constitutionality of the Act. The
34. Law, supra note 33 at 402, 406-07.
35. Id at 402; Mark R. Brown, Weathering Constitutional Change, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 1091,
1112.
36. 279 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 71 U.S.L.W. 3351 (U.S. Nov. 18, 2002) (No.02-
479). Plaintiff Dr. Hason had sued the Medical Board of California in federal district court for allegedly
discriminating against him on disability grounds. 279 F.3d at 1170. His application for a medical license
was turned down for reasons of mental illness. Id. The trial court judge dismissed his claims, concluding
that they were barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The court interpreted Garrett to confer
immunity against suits such as the one at bar. Id. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit remanded for the lower
court to consider the merits of plaintiffs claims. The court of appeals found that the Eleventh
Amendment did not bar claims where, as in Title 11 of the ADA, Congress had acted in accordance with
its powers in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and had abrogated the immunity of a state.
Furthermore, the court noted that the Garrett Court had not ruled on whether the Congress's abrogation
of state sovereign immunity in Title II of the ADA was a valid exercise of its Section 5 powers. Id. at
1171.
37. 273 F.3d 844 (9th Cir., 2002), cert. granted, 70 U.S.L.W. 3788 (U.S. June 24, 2002) (No. 01-
1368).
38. Pub. L. No. 103-3 § 2, 107 Stat. 6, 29 U.S.C. 2601 (2003).
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case squarely presents the question of whether Congress properly exercised its
remedial powers under the Fourteenth Amendment in enacting this piece of
legislation.
In light of the Court's negative response to this question in analogous
cases, 39 the more appropriate question to ask is whether the Court will again
challenge congressional authority to enact remedial legislation under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 2601 of the FMLA is replete with
findings of why the legislation is necessary, demonstrating Congress's
acceptance of the Court's mandate that it act like a subordinate court when
enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment. If it reverses Congress, the Court will
again spurn the representatives' interpretation of the needs of an oppressed
people to accommodate neat doctrinal analyses that reflect the Constitution
only tangentially.
Commentators agree that the Supreme Court's federalism and state
sovereign immunity decisions betray a lack of trust in the political process and
in the lawmaking power of Congress.4 ° While sovereign immunity and
federalism cannot be said to be totally irrelevant, they appear to have
interposed themselves between right and remedy, and between a nation, its
representatives, and their Constitution. It is worth noting that no idea is
unassailable, no principle is beyond reproach, and no concept beyond reproof.
An idea that becomes unassailable too frequently confronts the demands of
freedom. That danger is especially great when the principle is not directly
mandated by the Constitution.
The Court's own charter recognizes this tension. The Court fulfills its
mission and derives its greatest legitimacy in expressing fidelity to the
governed whose consent-the Constitution-it claims to safeguard.
39. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; supra note 22.
40. Compare Melvin R. Durchslag, Accommodation by Declaration, 33 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1375,
1378-79 (2000) (describing the Court's approach as reflecting a "general distrust of federal legislative
power"), and David J. Garrow, A Reliably Assertive Supreme Court, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 2,
2001, at 9 (stressing "the Court majority's active and repeated contempt for Congress's lawmaking
power"), with Kate Stith, Justice White and the Law, 112 YALE L.J. 993, 993 (2003) (highlighting the
late Justice Byron R. White's belief "that those who hold positions of public trust generally act in good
faith").

